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CLOCK STAGE ANALYSIS: Auction 110 Summary (3450-3550 MHz Band)

General Auction Statistics at End of Round 31:
Gross Proceeds after Round: $8,364,163,000
Qualified Bidders (Clock Phase): 33
Products with Supply < Demand: 157
Products with Supply = Demand: 207
Products with Supply > Demand: 117
Products with No Demand:
(subset of Products with Supply > Demand)
56
Total Provisionally Sold Blocks: 3678
Total Unsold Blocks: 382

PEA-Level Statistics at the End of Round 31:
PEAs with Supply < Demand: 128
PEAs with Supply = Demand: 193
PEAs with Supply > Demand: 85
PEAs with No Demand:
(subset of PEAs with Supply > Demand)
0
Largest PEA (by Population) with Demand Change: New York, NY

Nationwide Price Per MHz-POP Statistics at End of Round 31:
Based on 2010 Census Data Based on 2020 Census Data(1)
Average Across All Categories: $0.283057 $0.263361
Category 1: $0.291935 $0.271297
Category 2: $0.153649 $0.145499
(1) Because the FCC and DoD released their data for this auction using 2010 Census Data, we use 2010 Census population estimates except where explicitly stated otherwise (as is the case here).

Nationwide Gross Proceeds by Category at End of Round 31:
Category 1: $8,072,672,200
Category 2: $291,490,800

Minimum Proceeds Required to Purchase One Block Nationwide at End of Round 31:
Any Category: $810,394,400
Estimated Shortfall to Reserve Price at End of Round 31:
Reserve Price: $14,775,354,330
Shortfall (based on gross proceeds): $6,411,191,330
Shortfall (based on estimated net proceeds)(1): $6,494,832,960
(1) To calculate net proceeds we assume that gross revenues will be reduced by 1% due to bidding credits.
This is 1% estimate may be conservative based on past auctions.







Price Per MHz-POP Analysis
Average Price Per MHz-POP in Each PEA after Round 31: (average across all categories in each PEA)

Click Here for Interactive Map




Price Per MHz-POP in Each PEA for Category 1 after Round 31:

Click Here for Interactive Map



Price Per MHz-POP in Each PEA for Category 2 after Round 31:

Click Here for Interactive Map


Price Per MHz-POP in Top 20 PEAs by Population after Round 31:
market_number market_name category aggregate_demand posted_price supply gross_proceeds price_mhz_pop
PEA001 New York, NY Cat1 13 $132,176,000 10 $1,321,760,000 $0.523738
PEA002 Los Angeles, CA Cat1 17 $101,687,000 10 $1,016,870,000 $0.523885
PEA003 Chicago, IL Cat1 18 $49,114,000 10 $491,140,000 $0.524346
PEA004 San Francisco, CA Cat1 17 $47,311,000 10 $473,110,000 $0.524051
PEA005 Baltimore, MD-Washington, DC Cat1 10 $33,994,000 10 $339,940,000 $0.433479
PEA006 Philadelphia, PA Cat1 10 $7,870,100 10 $78,701,000 $0.103728
PEA007 Boston, MA Cat1 11 $35,545,000 10 $355,450,000 $0.524569
PEA008 Dallas, TX Cat1 13 $33,840,000 10 $338,400,000 $0.524450
PEA009 Miami, FL Cat1 13 $33,024,000 10 $330,240,000 $0.524867
PEA010 Houston, TX Cat1 13 $30,915,000 10 $309,150,000 $0.524695
PEA011 Atlanta, GA Cat1 11 $28,556,000 10 $285,560,000 $0.525379
PEA012 Detroit, MI Cat1 11 $26,965,000 10 $269,650,000 $0.524868
PEA013 Orlando, FL Cat1 11 $23,957,000 10 $239,570,000 $0.525069
PEA014 Cleveland, OH Cat1 14 $8,293,000 10 $82,930,000 $0.202432
PEA015 Phoenix, AZ Cat1 11 $18,225,000 10 $182,250,000 $0.477455
PEA016 Seattle, WA Cat1 11 $7,678,000 10 $76,780,000 $0.202467
PEA017 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN Cat1 11 $11,070,000 10 $110,700,000 $0.326540
PEA018 San Diego, CA Cat1 10 $2,658,000 10 $26,580,000 $0.085872
PEA019 Portland, OR Cat1 13 $15,880,000 10 $158,800,000 $0.525368
PEA020 Denver, CO Cat1 13 $14,669,000 10 $146,690,000 $0.525833

20 Most Expensive PEAs by Price Per MHz-POP after Round 31: (ave. for all categories)
market_number market_name price_mhz_pop
PEA046 Little Rock, AR $0.531712
PEA045 Raleigh, NC $0.530029
PEA043 Charlotte, NC $0.528784
PEA035 Austin, TX $0.528055
PEA032 Nashville, TN $0.527383
PEA028 San Antonio, TX $0.526032
PEA020 Denver, CO $0.525833
PEA011 Atlanta, GA $0.525379
PEA019 Portland, OR $0.525368
PEA013 Orlando, FL $0.525069
PEA012 Detroit, MI $0.524868
PEA009 Miami, FL $0.524867
PEA010 Houston, TX $0.524695
PEA007 Boston, MA $0.524569
PEA008 Dallas, TX $0.524450
PEA003 Chicago, IL $0.524346
PEA004 San Francisco, CA $0.524051
PEA002 Los Angeles, CA $0.523885
PEA001 New York, NY $0.523738
PEA015 Phoenix, AZ $0.477455


20 Most Expensive Products by Price Per MHz-POP after Round 31: (any category)
market_number market_name category aggregate_demand posted_price supply gross_proceeds price_mhz_pop
PEA046 Little Rock, AR Cat2 8 $6,783,000 6 $40,698,000 $0.531712
PEA045 Raleigh, NC Cat2 10 $6,903,000 6 $41,418,000 $0.530029
PEA044 Rochester, NY Cat2 4 $6,968,000 2 $13,936,000 $0.529425
PEA050 Greenville, SC Cat2 10 $6,461,000 6 $38,766,000 $0.529170
PEA041 Syracuse, NY Cat2 4 $7,259,000 2 $14,518,000 $0.529097
PEA043 Charlotte, NC Cat2 10 $7,017,000 6 $42,102,000 $0.528784
PEA035 Austin, TX Cat1 12 $8,601,000 10 $86,010,000 $0.528055
PEA032 Nashville, TN Cat1 12 $9,221,000 10 $92,210,000 $0.527383
PEA028 San Antonio, TX Cat1 14 $10,519,000 10 $105,190,000 $0.526032
PEA020 Denver, CO Cat1 13 $14,669,000 10 $146,690,000 $0.525833
PEA011 Atlanta, GA Cat1 11 $28,556,000 10 $285,560,000 $0.525379
PEA019 Portland, OR Cat1 13 $15,880,000 10 $158,800,000 $0.525368
PEA013 Orlando, FL Cat1 11 $23,957,000 10 $239,570,000 $0.525069
PEA012 Detroit, MI Cat1 11 $26,965,000 10 $269,650,000 $0.524868
PEA009 Miami, FL Cat1 13 $33,024,000 10 $330,240,000 $0.524867
PEA010 Houston, TX Cat1 13 $30,915,000 10 $309,150,000 $0.524695
PEA007 Boston, MA Cat1 11 $35,545,000 10 $355,450,000 $0.524569
PEA008 Dallas, TX Cat1 13 $33,840,000 10 $338,400,000 $0.524450
PEA003 Chicago, IL Cat1 18 $49,114,000 10 $491,140,000 $0.524346
PEA004 San Francisco, CA Cat1 17 $47,311,000 10 $473,110,000 $0.524051




Deep Dive: Required Coordination in the 3450-3550 MHz Band
Before a licensee commences operations in a Cooperative Planning Area (CPA) or Periodic Use Area (PUA), it must first successfully coordinate with the federal incumbent(s) associated with that area. The image below to the left illustrates the geographic boundaries for each of the coordination areas. Green indicates CPAs only, blue indicates CPAs & PUAs that completely overlap, and turquoise blue indicates the CPA and PUA which only partially overlap (Naval Air Station, Patuxent River). The image below to the right shows which census tracts (based on 2010 US Census) overlap with these coordination areas. Both images come from an interactive map which can be found here.



In general, if all 10 blocks in a PEA are Category 1 licenses, they are subject to the same coordination requirements. In those markets where there are both Category 1 and Category 2 licenses, it is because the PEAs intersect with one of the special cases (e.g., Little Rock CPA, Fort Bragg CPA and PUA, Syracuse, Rochester and Watertown) and therefore have different rules depending on the block. In addition, because each license overlaps with CPAs and PUAs at varying percentages of their populations, the coordination requirements are not equal even within a particular category of licenses. Therefore I have developed a new classification scheme to help bidders better understand these restrictions on each product based on the percentage of the PEA's population that requires coordination at the close of the auction (Year 0) and after one year (Year 1) (as a percent of their 2010 US Census population statistics, which was also used by the DoD). More specifically, this classification scheme breaks down as follows:

Coordination Classification Required Coordination at Year 1 Required Coordination at Year 0
A >=75% >=75%
B >=50% & <75% >=75%
C >=50% & <75% >=50% & <75%
D >0% & <50% >=75%
E >0% & <50% >=50% & <75%
F >0% & <50% >0% & <50%
G 0% >=75%
H 0% >=50% & <75%
I 0% >0% & <50%
J 0% 0%

The maps below show which blocks within each PEA fall into each coordination classification for both Category 1 and Category 2 licenses.


Coordination Classifications for Category 1 Licenses:

Click Here for Interactive Map



Coordination Classifications for Category 2 Licenses:

Click Here for Interactive Map



The defined CPAs and PUAs result in 29.8 percent of Licenses and roughly 18 percent of MHz-POPs requiring coordination after the close of the auction (and dropping to roughly 16 percent of MHz-POPs one year after the close of the auction)(1). However, it should also be noted that these coordination zones are based on conservative assumption of 100 meter tower heights which likely overstates the actual impact on wireless operations.
(1) Using 2020 Census data, those population percentages are basically the same.

Nationwide Gross Proceeds by Coordination Classification at End of Round 31:
Coordination Classification Gross Proceeds
A $467,514,200
B $12,000
C $97,377,600
D $1,122,000
E Not Applicable
F $3,044,623,400
G $66,857,400
H Not Applicable
I $13,358,400
J $4,673,298,000
Nationwide Price Per MHz-POP Statistics by Coordination Classification at End of Round 31:
Coordination Classification Price Per MHz-POP
A $0.167615
B $0.003014
C $0.147141
D $0.037992
E Not Applicable
F $0.420525
G $0.133163
H Not Applicable
I $0.057120
J $0.258351




Additional Round-by-Round Analysis









3D Map of Gross Proceeds by Category in Each PEA after Round 31

Click Here for Interactive 3D Map




Treemap of Gross Proceeds in Each PEA after Round 31 (sum across all categories)




Demand Analysis
Excess or Net Demand (Demand-Supply) in Each PEA after Round 31:
(across all categories in each PEA)

Click Here for Interactive Map



Change in Demand in Round 31 from Prior Round in Each PEA:
(across all categories in each PEA)

Click Here for Interactive Map


20 PEAs with the Largest Excess Demand after Round 31:
(across all categories in each PEA)

market_number market_name aggregate_demand supply excess_demand
PEA104 Fort Collins, CO 20 10 10
PEA119 Yakima, WA 20 10 10
PEA182 Cedar Rapids, IA 20 10 10
PEA211 Ardmore, OK 20 10 10
PEA217 Lubbock, TX 20 10 10
PEA003 Chicago, IL 18 10 8
PEA071 Knoxville, TN 18 10 8
PEA075 Albuquerque, NM 18 10 8
PEA076 Reno, NV 18 10 8
PEA114 Morgantown, WV 18 10 8
PEA143 Keene, NH 18 10 8
PEA209 Green Bay, WI 18 10 8
PEA002 Los Angeles, CA 17 10 7
PEA004 San Francisco, CA 17 10 7
PEA038 Milwaukee, WI 17 10 7
PEA156 Boise City, ID 17 10 7
PEA053 Tucson, AZ 16 10 6
PEA065 Cape Coral, FL 16 10 6
PEA067 Sarasota, FL 16 10 6
PEA070 Eugene, OR 16 10 6

20 PEAs with Largest Absolute Change in Demand after Round 31
from Prior Round:
(across all categories in each PEA)

market_number market_name aggregate_demand demand_change
PEA038 Milwaukee, WI 17 4
PEA085 Charleston, SC 14 -4
PEA089 Columbia, SC 9 -4
PEA001 New York, NY 13 -3
PEA008 Dallas, TX 13 2
PEA009 Miami, FL 13 2
PEA010 Houston, TX 13 2
PEA019 Portland, OR 13 2
PEA020 Denver, CO 13 2
PEA028 San Antonio, TX 14 2
PEA039 Oklahoma City, OK 14 2
PEA046 Little Rock, AR 8 -2
PEA185 Marquette, MI 14 -2
PEA244 Manhattan, KS 10 -2
PEA272 Brownwood, TX 10 -2
PEA388 Atlantic, IA 10 2
PEA003 Chicago, IL 18 -1
PEA004 San Francisco, CA 17 -1
PEA007 Boston, MA 11 -1
PEA053 Tucson, AZ 16 1



Change in Aggregate Demand for All PEAs by Round: (across all categories in each PEA)
(Double click on legend to switch to a different PEA)

20 PEAs with Largest Absolute Change in Demand in Category 1 after Round 31 from Prior Round:
market_number market_name category aggregate_demand demand_change
PEA038 Milwaukee, WI Cat1 17 4
PEA001 New York, NY Cat1 13 -3
PEA008 Dallas, TX Cat1 13 2
PEA009 Miami, FL Cat1 13 2
PEA010 Houston, TX Cat1 13 2
PEA019 Portland, OR Cat1 13 2
PEA020 Denver, CO Cat1 13 2
PEA028 San Antonio, TX Cat1 14 2
PEA039 Oklahoma City, OK Cat1 14 2
PEA185 Marquette, MI Cat1 14 -2
PEA244 Manhattan, KS Cat1 10 -2
PEA272 Brownwood, TX Cat1 10 -2
PEA388 Atlantic, IA Cat1 10 2
PEA003 Chicago, IL Cat1 18 -1
PEA004 San Francisco, CA Cat1 17 -1
PEA007 Boston, MA Cat1 11 -1
PEA053 Tucson, AZ Cat1 16 1

20 PEAs with Largest Absolute Change in Demand in Category 2 after Round 31 from Prior Round:
market_number market_name category aggregate_demand demand_change
PEA085 Charleston, SC Cat2 10 -4
PEA089 Columbia, SC Cat2 8 -4
PEA046 Little Rock, AR Cat2 8 -2




Tracking Auction 110's Progress Toward Completion after Round 31

NOTE: Because the prior nonlogarithmic chart is somewhat skewed by the large excess demand in the early rounds, we have repeated the chart above taking the log (base 10) of the values on both axeses:


NOTE: This next chart looks at changes in excess demand in dollars after removing the impact of round price increases. Please note negative scale. Also, this chart is not relevant for Round 1 because there are no prior rounds.






Comparing Auction 110's Progress to Prior FCC Auctions after Round 31

The chart below tracks auction progress (using the metric of excess demand as a percent of aggregate demand) against other recent prior FCC auctions.

NOTE: Any comparison between Auction 97 (the AWS-3 auction and an SMRA auction) and the other auctions shown (which are all clock auctions) needs several important caveats. SMRAs have a fundamentally different structures from clocks auctions (e.g., SMRAs allow bidders to bid for specific licenses whereas in clock auctions you bid for generic blocks; SMRAs determine provisional winners after reach round whereas clock auctions just determine aggregate demand at the end of each round). Participants in an SMRA also face different rules regarding the exiting of accepted bid (e.g., a provisionally winning bidder in an SMRA is allowed to submit a withdrawal bid subject to a withdrawal penalty whereas in a clock auction a bidder may not withdraw a bid once demand equals supply). Finally, in SMRAs, bidders do not need to affirmatively bid in every round for licenses that they have provisionally won as they will have an opportunity to bid again in the next round if their provisionally winning bid is outbid in the current round. These differences make any direct comparisons difficult. Nevertheless, with all these caveats in mind and using a simple moving average to “smooth” the variations in demand that you see from round-to-round in an SMRA, I thought that it might still be interesting to make a comparison between Auction 97 and this auction.

Also note that I have revised the line graph above for Auction 1002 to account for the fact that there were both stages and rounds. The change I made should make for better comparisons.




Fun: Comparing Current PEA Prices to Predicted Prices Based on Prior FCC Auctions after Round 31

In the bubble graph below, we attempt to track how current PEA prices (on a price per MHz pop basis) compare to their "Predicted Price" based on past FCC auctions. To accomplish this comparison, we need to introduce the concept of the "Overprice Ratio". This Overprice Ratio is the current price of each PEA divided by the Predicted Price for that PEA.

This Predicted Price for any PEA is calculated by first classifying each PEA into its relevant REAG (an FCC licensing schema that divides the country into 6 regions) and then identifying a "Reference Market" for that REAG. Typically, the Reference Market for each REAG is the largest PEA by population (with the exception of the Southeast REAG where we selected Atlanta as its Reference Market rather than Washington DC, which we have reclassified as being in the Northeast REAG). For those PEAs that are Reference Markets, we use the New York PEA (the "Nationwide Reference Market") as their Reference Market. We then take the current price for each Reference Market and multiply it by the historical ratio of auction prices between each PEA and its Reference Market to get the Predicted Price.

The y-axis on the left shows the log (base 10) of the "Overprice Ratio." We take the log of the Overprice Ratio to lessen the impact of outliers. By definition, the New York PEA (shown in the graph as the biggest bubble in dark blue below), as the Nationwide Reference Market, will always remain at y=0 (the horizontal green line in the graph below).

In addition, the x-axis shows aggregate demand in each PEA after the latest round. There is a vertical green line where aggregate demand equals 14. This the maximum number of licenses available for sale in eac PEA. Thus, if the bubble shows up to the right of this green vertical line, aggregate demand in this PEA is greater than supply. Also, the y-axis on the right side of the graph tracks the current price for New York PEA after the latest round and is adjusted so that New York PEA's price always remains on the green horizontal line in the graph below. Finally, the bubbles representing the PEAs are sized based on population and color-coded based on the PEA that they fall in.

Example:
Pick San Diego. Its Reference Market is Los Angeles.

Suppose
San Diego current aggregate demand = 10
San Diego current price (average across categories) = $0.50
Los Angeles current price (average across categories) = $0.75
Historical ratio (San Diego/Los Angeles) = 1.09784

Compute
San Diego current Predicted Price = $0.75 * 1.09784 = $0.82338
San Diego Overprice Ratio = $0.50 / $0.82338 = 0.607253
San Diego logarithmic-scaled Overprice Ratio = Log10(0.607253) = -0.21663

Interpretation
In the logarithmic-scaled chart below, San Diego is represented by a bubble with coordinates (x,y) = (10,-0.21663). That means San Diego is underpriced. All bubbles with negative values are underpriced; conversely, all bubbles with positive values are overpriced with respect to their Reference Market's current price. Before the Reference Market's price converges, any underpriced PEA is a valid prediction due to the non-decreasing price property; however, the converse may not be true until the Reference Market's price converges.

To get the complete list of Reference Markets, Predicted Prices and Overprice Ratios for any PEA see the Table below.

Deals Following Round 31: Most Underpriced PEAs (Above 1 Million in Population) Relative to their Predicted Price:
Market Number Market Name Population Aggregate Demand Supply Bidding Units Ave. Current Price MHz Pop (for PEA) Reference Market Reference Market Name Predicted Price (for PEA) Overprice Ratio (Log Base 10)
PEA038 Milwaukee, WI 1,555,908 17 10 1,560 $0.139019 PEA003 Chicago, IL $0.244473 -0.245158
PEA008 Dallas, TX 6,452,472 13 10 6,450 $0.524450 PEA001 New York, NY $0.675532 -0.109941
PEA009 Miami, FL 6,291,880 13 10 6,290 $0.524867 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $0.654515 -0.095870
PEA018 San Diego, CA 3,095,313 10 10 3,100 $0.085872 PEA002 Los Angeles, CA $0.106640 -0.094068
PEA002 Los Angeles, CA 19,410,169 17 10 19,410 $0.523885 PEA001 New York, NY $0.638638 -0.086019
PEA031 Indianapolis, IN 1,769,011 10 10 1,770 $0.297963 PEA003 Chicago, IL $0.344037 -0.062442
PEA015 Phoenix, AZ 3,817,117 11 10 3,820 $0.477455 PEA002 Los Angeles, CA $0.545440 -0.057815
PEA021 Tampa, FL 2,783,243 10 10 2,780 $0.395582 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $0.440188 -0.046402
PEA045 Raleigh, NC 1,302,381 10 10 1,300 $0.530029 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $0.572960 -0.033825
PEA040 Birmingham, AL 1,399,686 10 10 1,400 $0.297995 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $0.318383 -0.028740
PEA039 Oklahoma City, OK 1,446,527 14 10 1,450 $0.298024 PEA008 Dallas, TX $0.316222 -0.025740
PEA043 Charlotte, NC 1,327,006 10 10 1,330 $0.528784 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $0.560526 -0.025317
PEA005 Baltimore, MD-Washington, DC 7,842,134 10 10 7,840 $0.433479 PEA001 New York, NY $0.457733 -0.023645
PEA033 Virginia Beach, VA 1,698,835 6 10 1,700 $0.033023 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $0.033877 -0.011097
PEA026 Las Vegas, NV 2,151,455 10 10 2,150 $0.296962 PEA002 Los Angeles, CA $0.303650 -0.009673
PEA003 Chicago, IL 9,366,713 18 10 9,370 $0.524346 PEA001 New York, NY $0.535187 -0.008888
PEA036 New Orleans, LA 1,622,143 13 10 1,620 $0.270691 PEA030 Kansas City, MO $0.275963 -0.008376
PEA050 Greenville, SC 1,220,968 14 10 1,220 $0.330705 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $0.329721 0.001293
PEA011 Atlanta, GA 5,435,312 11 10 5,440 $0.525379 PEA001 New York, NY $0.516254 0.007610
PEA030 Kansas City, MO 1,810,075 10 10 1,810 $0.297667 PEA001 New York, NY $0.277803 0.029994





BETA: Probability of Getting Stuck in Any Product by Round
In the chart below, we are experimenting with an "early warning" system for bidders that will help them assess the probability of getting stuck in the next round because demand will fall below supply. The hope that this system will provide bidders with an earlier warning than simply looking at the excess demand. The y-axis in the chart shows "Probability of Getting Stuck." This y-value is really a binomial probability distribution which we think can be used to approximate a stochastic model of bidders in decision making to reduce, maintain, and increase demand on a category. The closer y-values approach 1, the more likely that a bidder could become stuck in that product.

To calculate this binomial probability, we use the general binomial probability formula:

Formula: p(k=t) = C(n,t) * pt * (1-p)(n-t), where C(n,t) = n!/[t! * (n-t)!]
and where:
  • p is the probability of a bidder to reduce demand given n and supply
  • n represents aggregate demand
  • t represents aggregate number of reduce demand blocks
  • p(k=t) is the probability of having reduce demand as many as t blocks

There are a few assumptions one has to make for this probability to be valid:
  • Each block of excess demand will represent a bidder. (Since we lack information on bidder's requested demand, we have no choice but to make this assumption).
  • Every bidder is identical and independent.
  • Perhaps, most debatable, that p is equal to 50%. This means that a bidder's likelihood to reduce its demand stays consistent throughout the auction. But in the abscence of better information about bidders, this might be the fairest assumption.

(Double click on legend to switch to a different product)





BETA: Network Graph for Selected Round

Network Graphs show interconnections between a set of entities. In the network graph below, I show the interconnections between PEAs in each round. These interconnections are repsented by "nodes" and "edges."

Each node in the graph represents a PEA. Each node is color coded based on whether aggregate demand increased or reduced demand in the PEA in the round and each node is also sized according to population. You can hover over each node to get information about this PEA including the number of connections to that node and the demand change in the PEA in the round.

An edge (or line between nodes) in the graph means that aggregate demand (across all bidders) shifted from one PEA and moved into one or more new PEAs in the same round. While you cannot say definitively that a bidder moved its demand from one particular PEA to another specific PEA if there is more than one PEA with shifting demand in the same round, an edge does indicate that bidders in aggregate decided to reduce demand in a PEA (node) at one end of the edge and increased their demand in a PEA (node) at the other end of the edge in the same round. Because there can be a lot of edges in a round, you may have to zoom in the graph to better follow these edges. I have also inserted small light blue markers (in the shape of a cross) in the middle of each edge which reveals which nodes are connected by the edge highlighted.


The image below shows the last round with a network graph (which may not be all rounds).




Please use the dropdown to generate the network graph for prior rounds. As not every round had aggregate demand for one PEA decrease and aggregate demand in another PEA increase, not all rounds are available to be selected.

Select Round Number



Please Select a Round to Display Network Graph








Download to Excel or View Details on All PEAs After Round 31

Selected PEA Details(1)
(1) Calculations in the table below are based on 2010 Census figures unless designated with a "2020" in the column title.

Market Number Market Name Category Population Population 2020 Bidding Units Supply Aggregate Demand Excess Demand Demand Change Coord % Year 0 Coord % Year 1 Coord Class Posted Price Gross Proceeds Price Per MHz POP (for product) Price Per MHz POP 2020 (for product) Price Per MHz POP (for PEA) Reference Market Number Reference Market Name Predicted Price (for PEA) Overprice Ratio (Log Base10)