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**NOTE: NOW FEATURING POST-AUCTION ANALYSIS.**
(Clock Auction Analysis Now Found Below Post-Auction Analysis)

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POST-AUCTION ANALYSIS FOR AUCTION 107 (3700-3980 MHz Band)
**Note: License categories are based on clock stage categories for sake of consistency.**

Total Proceeds at End of Assignment Stage:
Gross Proceeds Net Proceeds
All Categories: $81,168,677,645 $81,114,481,921
Category A: $23,257,851,922 $23,257,851,922
Category BC: $37,847,048,991 $37,847,048,991
Category ABC: $20,063,776,732 $20,009,581,008

Nationwide Price Per MHz-POP Statistics at End of Assignment Stage:
Net Price Per MHz-POP Fully-Loaded Net Price Per MHz-POP (1)
Average Across All Categories: $0.944631 $1.096024
Category A: $1.312893 $1.619281
Category BC: $1.186914 $1.342050
Category ABC: $0.551728 $0.624122
(1) Fully-Loaded Prices include an estimated $9.7 B in accelerated clearing payments and $3.3 B in relocation costs.




POST-AUCTION ANALYSIS: Breakdown of Winning Bidders Across All Blocks and A Blocks


POST-AUCTION ANALYSIS: Bidder Summary(2)
Bidder # of Markets Covered # of Licenses Won Ave. Depth Weighted Ave. Depth Pops Covered % of CONUS Covered Net Payments $/MHz-POP FULLY-LOADED $/MHz-POP
Cellco Partnership 406 3,511 8.65 8.05 306,675,006 100.00% $45,454,843,197 $0.921088 $1.070411
AT&T Spectrum Frontiers LLC 406 1,621 3.99 3.99 306,675,006 100.00% $23,406,860,839 $0.955422 $1.119532
T-Mobile License LLC 72 142 1.97 1.99 207,704,778 67.73% $9,336,125,147 $1.131190 $1.279169
United States Cellular Corporation 99 254 2.57 2.54 30,966,188 10.10% $1,282,641,542 $0.815102 $0.921776
NewLevel II, L.P. 10 10 1.00 1.00 55,082,417 17.96% $1,277,395,688 $1.159531 $1.311535
Canopy Spectrum, LLC 43 84 1.95 1.92 18,465,137 6.02% $172,021,760 $0.243157 $0.279680
Cellular South Licenses, LLC 4 8 2.00 2.00 2,006,233 0.65% $49,850,284 $0.621193 $0.702659
Widespread Wireless, LLC 7 14 2.00 2.00 4,001,453 1.30% $48,455,001 $0.302734 $0.355670
Pioneer Telephone Cooperative, Inc. 2 4 2.00 2.00 286,375 0.09% $20,104,200 $1.755059 $2.025845
Carolina West Wireless, Inc. 4 7 1.75 1.84 867,064 0.28% $15,780,658 $0.495899 $0.572411
Nex-Tech Wireless, L.L.C. 5 5 1.00 1.00 762,494 0.25% $10,339,437 $0.678001 $0.782553
East Kentucky Network, LLC 1 1 1.00 1.00 620,049 0.20% $7,374,390 $0.594662 $0.686412
Horry Telephone Cooperative, Inc. 2 3 1.50 1.89 443,600 0.14% $6,492,586 $0.387306 $0.447063
Smith Bagley, Inc. 3 4 1.33 1.42 407,716 0.13% $5,640,183 $0.487957 $0.563236
Nsight Spectrum, LLC 2 3 1.50 1.39 552,032 0.18% $5,424,123 $0.353044 $0.399344
LICT Wireless Broadband Company, LLC 5 5 1.00 1.00 425,866 0.14% $4,267,485 $0.501036 $0.566745
Agri-Valley Communications, Inc. 2 2 1.00 1.00 511,902 0.17% $4,178,141 $0.408100 $0.471065
Union Telephone Company 1 2 2.00 2.00 125,434 0.04% $2,655,060 $0.529175 $0.610820
Little Bear Wireless L.L.C. 1 1 1.00 1.00 213,445 0.07% $2,510,020 $0.587978 $0.665089
Grand River Communications, Inc. 1 2 2.00 2.00 37,191 0.01% $1,351,670 $0.908600 $1.048787
Granite Wireless LLC 1 1 1.00 1.00 21,294 0.01% $170,510 $0.400371 $0.452878
(2) As noted above, Fully-Loaded Prices include an estimated $9.7 B in accelerated clearing payments and $3.3 B in relocation costs.
The Price per MHz-POP calculations use net payments in the numerator.
Also, for those not familiar with these bidding entities, "Cellco Partnership" is Verizon and "Little Bear Wireless L.L.C" is DISH. NewLevel II, L.P. and Canopy Spectrum, LLC are backed by private equity firms.


POST-AUCTION ANALYSIS: Maps of Licenses Won By Key Bidders

Verizon Licenses Won (All Categories)

T-Mobile Licenses Won (All Categories)


AT&T Licenses Won (All Categories)

US Cellular Licenses Won (All Categories)


NewLevel II Licenses Won (All Categories)

Canopy Spectrum Licenses Won (All Categories)



POST-AUCTION ANALYSIS: Demand Reduction by Bidder In Each Round (in $)
"


POST-AUCTION ANALYSIS: Fun Facts

Question 1: How much did T-Mobile drive up the costs for Verizon in the A block during the clock phase of bidding?

Answer 1(a):
T-Mobile Alone: $0(3)

(3) This number is the sum of the increases in price that Verizon paid for A block licenses during the clock rounds for PEAs where the price would not have gone up but for T-Mobile's participation.

Answer 1(b):
T-Mobile Together with Other Bidders (approximately): $6,721,040,000(4)

(4) This number is the sum of the increases in price that Verizon paid for A block licenses during the clock rounds for PEAs where T-Mobile's participation contributed, but was not solely responsible for, increasing the price.




Question 2: Who were the unlucky bidders that won the BC blocks in Tampa and paid more than winners of the A blocks?

Answer 2: AT&T Spectrum Frontiers LLC & Cellco Partnership & T-Mobile License LLC(5)
(5) These bidders were unluckly because in Tampa, the BC blocks finished with higher fully-loaded prices than the A blocks during the clock stage of the auction.




Question 3: What was the value of blocks where Verizon tried to reduce demand but got stuck?

Answer 3(a):
All Categories (estimate): $3,569,730,558(6)
(6) This number is the product of (a) the number of blocks across any category where Verizon tried to reduce demand but was not able to because demand fell below supply in that round and subsequent rounds and (b) the final posted price.

Answer 3(b):
Just BC Blocks (estimate): $2,955,584,558(7)
(7) This number is the product of (a) the number of BC blocks only where Verizon tried to reduce demand but was not able to because demand fell below supply in that round and subsequent rounds and (b) the final posted price.




Question 4: What was the value of blocks where AT&T tried to reduce demand but got stuck?

Answer 4(a):
All Categories (estimate): $705,189,923(8)
(8) This number is the product of (a) the number of blocks across any category where AT&T tried to reduce demand but was not able to because demand fell below supply in that round and subsequent rounds and (b) the final posted price.

Answer 4(b):
Just BC Blocks (estimate): $47,172,160(9)
(9) This number is the product of (a) the number of BC blocks only where AT&T tried to reduce demand but was not able to because demand fell below supply in that round and subsequent rounds and (b) the final posted price.




Question 5: What was the value of blocks where T-Mobile tried to reduce demand but got stuck?

Answer 5(a):
All Categories (estimate): $117,864,640(10)
(10) This number is the product of (a) the number of blocks across any category where T-Mobile tried to reduce demand but was not able to because demand fell below supply in that round and subsequent rounds and (b) the final posted price.

Answer 5(b):
Just BC Blocks (estimate): $117,864,640(11)
(11) This number is the product of (a) the number of BC blocks only where T-Mobile tried to reduce demand but was not able to because demand fell below supply in that round and subsequent rounds and (b) the final posted price.



POST-AUCTION ANALYSIS: Maps Showing Where Key Bidders Got Stuck with More Licenses Than They Wanted

Verizon Excess Blocks (All Categories)

AT&T Excess Blocks (All Categories)


T-Mobile Excess Blocks (All Categories)






POST-AUCTION ANALYSIS: Network Graph for Selected Round
Network Graphs show interconnections between a set of entities. In the network graph below, I show the interconnections between PEAs and bidders in each round. These interconnections are repsented by "nodes" and "edges."

Each node in the graph represents a pairing between PEA and bidder. Thus, a PEA may appear more than once in the graph as a node if more than one bidder increased/decreased demand in the PEA in the round. Each node is color coded based on whether the bidder increased or reduced demand in the PEA in the round and each node is also sized according to population. You can hover over each node to get information about this PEA including the number of connections to that node and the demand change in the PEA in the round.

An edge (or line between nodes) in the graph means that a bidder changed its demand in one or more PEAs and moved into one or more new PEAs in the same round. While you cannot say definitively that a bidder moved its demand from one PEA to another specific PEA if there are more than one PEA with shifting demand in the same round, an edge does indicate that the bidder decided to reduce demand in a PEA (node) at one end of the edge and increased its demand in a PEA (node) at the other end of the edge in the same round. Because there can be a lot of edges in a round, you may have to zoom in the graph to better follow these edges. I have also inserted small light blue markers (in the shape of a cross) in the middle of each edge which reveals which nodes are connected by the edge highlighted.

Please use the dropdown to generate the network graph for a specific round. As not every round had a specific bidder reduce demand in one PEA and increase its demand in another PEA, not all rounds are available to be selected.


Select Round Number



Please Select a Round to Display Network Graph













CLOCK STAGE ANALYSIS: Auction 107 Summary (3700-3980 MHz Band)

General Auction Statistics at End of Round 97:
Gross Proceeds after Round 97: $80,916,832,754
Qualified Bidders (Clock Phase): 57
Products with Supply < Demand after Round 97: 0
Products with Supply = Demand after Round 97: 452
Products with Supply > Demand after Round 97: 0
Products with No Demand after Round 97:
(subset of Products with Supply > Demand)
0
Total Provisionally Sold Blocks after Round 97: 5684
Total Unsold Blocks after Round 97: 0

PEA-Level Statistics at the End of Round 97:
PEAs with Supply < Demand after Round 97: 0
PEAs with Supply = Demand after Round 97: 406
PEAs with Supply > Demand after Round 97: 0
PEAs with No Demand after Round 97:
(subset of PEAs with Supply > Demand)
0
Largest PEA (by Population) with Demand Change after Round 97: Franklin, NC

Nationwide Price Per MHz-POP Statistics at End of Round 97:
Based on Auction Prices Only Fully-Loaded Prices (1)
Average Across All Categories: $0.942329 $1.093722
Category A: $1.308321 $1.614709
Category BC: $1.182931 $1.338067
Category ABC: $0.552014 $0.624408
Category BC and ABC: $0.847198 $0.958305
(1) Fully-Loaded Prices include an estimated $9.7 B in accelerated clearing payments and $3.3 B in relocation costs.

Nationwide Gross Proceeds by Category at End of Round 97:
Category A: $23,176,850,950
Category BC: $37,720,039,806
Category ABC: $20,019,941,998

Minimum Proceeds Required to Purchase One Block Nationwide at End of Round 97:
Any Category: $5,606,532,882
Just Category A (where available): $4,635,370,190


Average Price Per MHz POP in Each PEA after Round 97: (average across all categories in each PEA)

FULLY LOADED(1) Average Price Per MHz POP in Each PEA after Round 97: (average across all categories in each PEA)
(1) Fully-Loaded Prices (at PEA-level) shown in map include an estimated $9.7 B in accelerated clearing payments and $3.3 B in relocation costs. Fully-Loaded Prices for each product are available in the Excel download below.


Price Per MHz-POP in Top 20 PEAs by Population after Round 97:
market_number market_name category aggregate_demand posted_price supply gross_proceeds price_mhz_pop
PEA001 New York, NY A 5 $515,053,000 5 $2,575,265,000 $1.020430
PEA001 New York, NY BC 9 $515,167,123 9 $4,636,504,107 $1.020656
PEA002 Los Angeles, CA A 5 $554,174,000 5 $2,770,870,000 $1.427535
PEA002 Los Angeles, CA BC 9 $504,023,785 9 $4,536,214,065 $1.298350
PEA003 Chicago, IL A 5 $213,170,700 5 $1,065,853,500 $1.137916
PEA003 Chicago, IL BC 9 $202,303,000 9 $1,820,727,000 $1.079904
PEA004 San Francisco, CA A 5 $246,363,910 5 $1,231,819,550 $1.364453
PEA004 San Francisco, CA BC 9 $223,606,320 9 $2,012,456,880 $1.238413
PEA005 Baltimore, MD-Washington, DC ABC 14 $193,803,000 14 $2,713,242,000 $1.235652
PEA006 Philadelphia, PA A 5 $140,715,960 5 $703,579,800 $0.927318
PEA006 Philadelphia, PA BC 9 $140,944,123 9 $1,268,497,107 $0.928822
PEA007 Boston, MA A 5 $151,870,360 5 $759,351,800 $1.120643
PEA007 Boston, MA BC 9 $138,451,123 9 $1,246,060,107 $1.021623
PEA008 Dallas, TX A 5 $223,058,000 5 $1,115,290,000 $1.728469
PEA008 Dallas, TX BC 9 $201,100,910 9 $1,809,908,190 $1.558325
PEA009 Miami, FL A 5 $206,971,000 5 $1,034,855,000 $1.644747
PEA009 Miami, FL BC 9 $188,155,000 9 $1,693,395,000 $1.495221
PEA010 Houston, TX A 5 $168,355,690 5 $841,778,450 $1.428681
PEA010 Houston, TX BC 9 $153,185,000 9 $1,378,665,000 $1.299941
PEA011 Atlanta, GA ABC 14 $134,458,123 14 $1,882,413,722 $1.236894
PEA012 Detroit, MI A 5 $100,320,460 5 $501,602,300 $0.976359
PEA012 Detroit, MI BC 9 $84,235,560 9 $758,120,040 $0.819814
PEA013 Orlando, FL A 5 $89,132,310 5 $445,661,550 $0.976762
PEA013 Orlando, FL BC 9 $86,846,183 9 $781,615,647 $0.951709
PEA014 Cleveland, OH A 5 $93,503,950 5 $467,519,750 $1.141217
PEA014 Cleveland, OH BC 9 $70,443,001 9 $633,987,009 $0.859758
PEA015 Phoenix, AZ A 5 $131,886,990 5 $659,434,950 $1.727573
PEA015 Phoenix, AZ BC 9 $127,510,450 9 $1,147,594,050 $1.670246
PEA016 Seattle, WA A 5 $102,970,300 5 $514,851,500 $1.357653
PEA016 Seattle, WA BC 9 $85,268,000 9 $767,412,000 $1.124250
PEA017 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN A 5 $101,395,000 5 $506,975,000 $1.495461
PEA017 Minneapolis-St. Paul, MN BC 9 $76,262,000 9 $686,358,000 $1.124778
PEA018 San Diego, CA A 5 $123,389,000 5 $616,945,000 $1.993159
PEA018 San Diego, CA BC 9 $102,189,980 9 $919,709,820 $1.650721
PEA019 Portland, OR A 5 $61,789,770 5 $308,948,850 $1.022115
PEA019 Portland, OR BC 9 $59,561,080 9 $536,049,720 $0.985248
PEA020 Denver, CO ABC 14 $69,140,123 14 $967,961,722 $1.239217

20 Most Expensive PEAs by Price Per MHz-POP after Round 97: (ave. for all categories)
market_number market_name price_mhz_pop
PEA369 Red Oak, IA $2.834888
PEA038 Milwaukee, WI $2.086550
PEA305 Altus, OK $2.072642
PEA302 Enid, OK $2.056968
PEA047 Brownsville, TX $1.793756
PEA406 Anamosa, IA $1.789878
PEA018 San Diego, CA $1.773020
PEA039 Oklahoma City, OK $1.769386
PEA031 Indianapolis, IN $1.717353
PEA015 Phoenix, AZ $1.690720
PEA008 Dallas, TX $1.619091
PEA026 Las Vegas, NV $1.585882
PEA050 Greenville, SC $1.564964
PEA009 Miami, FL $1.548623
PEA027 Salt Lake City, UT $1.518333
PEA033 Virginia Beach, VA $1.472492
PEA034 Fresno, CA $1.470341
PEA021 Tampa, FL $1.467440
PEA040 Birmingham, AL $1.462691
PEA045 Raleigh, NC $1.461076


Price Per MHz POP in Each PEA for Category A after Round 97:

Price Per MHz POP in Each PEA for Category BC and ABC after Round 97:



20 Most Expensive Products by Price Per MHz-POP after Round 97: (any category)
market_number market_name category aggregate_demand posted_price supply gross_proceeds price_mhz_pop
PEA369 Red Oak, IA ABC 14 $3,696,864 14 $51,756,096 $2.834888
PEA038 Milwaukee, WI A 5 $69,814,000 5 $349,070,000 $2.243513
PEA305 Altus, OK ABC 14 $5,913,000 14 $82,782,000 $2.072642
PEA302 Enid, OK ABC 14 $5,913,000 14 $82,782,000 $2.056968
PEA038 Milwaukee, WI BC 9 $62,216,050 9 $559,944,450 $1.999349
PEA018 San Diego, CA A 5 $123,389,000 5 $616,945,000 $1.993159
PEA031 Indianapolis, IN A 5 $64,869,000 5 $324,345,000 $1.833482
PEA039 Oklahoma City, OK BC 9 $52,572,123 9 $473,149,107 $1.817184
PEA047 Brownsville, TX BC 9 $45,918,000 9 $413,262,000 $1.816246
PEA406 Anamosa, IA ABC 14 $738,790 14 $10,343,060 $1.789878
PEA047 Brownsville, TX A 5 $44,326,000 5 $221,630,000 $1.753276
PEA008 Dallas, TX A 5 $223,058,000 5 $1,115,290,000 $1.728469
PEA015 Phoenix, AZ A 5 $131,886,990 5 $659,434,950 $1.727573
PEA039 Oklahoma City, OK A 5 $48,700,200 5 $243,501,000 $1.683349
PEA035 Austin, TX A 5 $54,659,750 5 $273,298,750 $1.677905
PEA026 Las Vegas, NV A 5 $72,105,600 5 $360,528,000 $1.675740
PEA015 Phoenix, AZ BC 9 $127,510,450 9 $1,147,594,050 $1.670246
PEA050 Greenville, SC A 5 $40,747,920 5 $203,739,600 $1.668673
PEA031 Indianapolis, IN BC 9 $58,477,740 9 $526,299,660 $1.652837
PEA018 San Diego, CA BC 9 $102,189,980 9 $919,709,820 $1.650721








3D Map of Gross Proceeds by Category in Each PEA after Round 97



Treemap of Gross Proceeds in Each PEA after Round 97 (sum across all categories)

Excess or Net Demand (Demand-Supply) in Each PEA after Round 97:
(across all categories in each PEA)


Change in Demand in Round 97 from Prior Round in Each PEA:
(across all categories in each PEA)

20 PEAs with the Largest Excess Demand after Round 97:
(across all categories in each PEA)

market_number market_name aggregate_demand supply excess_demand
PEA001 New York, NY 14 14 0
PEA271 Elmira, NY 14 14 0
PEA281 Muskogee, OK 14 14 0
PEA280 Garden City, KS 14 14 0
PEA279 Logan, UT 14 14 0
PEA278 Bartlesville, OK 14 14 0
PEA277 Hutchinson, KS 14 14 0
PEA276 Rapid City, SD 14 14 0
PEA275 Corsicana, TX 14 14 0
PEA274 Twin Falls, ID 14 14 0
PEA273 Bloomington, IL 14 14 0
PEA272 Brownwood, TX 14 14 0
PEA270 Ottawa, IL 14 14 0
PEA257 Cheyenne, WY 14 14 0
PEA269 Racine, WI 14 14 0
PEA268 Clinton, IA 14 14 0
PEA267 Sheboygan, WI 14 14 0
PEA266 Lenoir, NC 14 14 0
PEA265 Winona, MN 14 14 0
PEA263 Santa Fe, NM 14 14 0

20 PEAs with Largest Absolute Change in Demand after Round 97
from Prior Round:
(across all categories in each PEA)

market_number market_name aggregate_demand demand_change
PEA346 Franklin, NC 14 -6
PEA373 Walla Walla, WA 14 -2



Change in Aggregate Demand for All PEAs by Round: (across all categories in each PEA)
(Double click on legend to switch to a different PEA)


20 PEAs with Largest Absolute Change in Demand in Category A after Round 97 from Prior Round:
market_number market_name category aggregate_demand demand_change

20 PEAs with Largest Absolute Change in Demand in Category BC after Round 97 from Prior Round:
market_number market_name category aggregate_demand demand_change

20 PEAs with Largest Absolute Change in Demand in Category ABC after Round 97 from Prior Round:
market_number market_name category aggregate_demand demand_change
PEA346 Franklin, NC ABC 14 -6
PEA373 Walla Walla, WA ABC 14 -2



Tracking Auction 107's Progress Toward Completion after Round 97:

NOTE: Because the prior nonlogarithmic chart is somewhat skewed by the large excess demand in the early rounds, we have repeated the chart above taking the log (base 10) of the values on both axeses:


NOTE: This next chart looks at changes in excess demand in dollars after removing the impact of round price increases. Please note negative scale.






Comparing Auction 107's Progress to Prior FCC Auctions after Round 97:

The chart below tracks auction progress (using the metric of excess demand as a percent of aggregate demand) against other recent prior FCC auctions.

NOTE: Any comparison between Auction 97 (the AWS-3 auction and an SMRA auction) and the other auctions shown (which are all clock auctions) needs several important caveats. SMRAs have a fundamentally different structures from clocks auctions (e.g., SMRAs allow bidders to bid for specific licenses whereas in clock auctions you bid for generic blocks; SMRAs determine provisional winners after reach round whereas clock auctions just determine aggregate demand at the end of each round). Participants in an SMRA also face different rules regarding the exiting of accepted bid (e.g., a provisionally winning bidder in an SMRA is allowed to submit a withdrawal bid subject to a withdrawal penalty whereas in a clock auction a bidder may not withdraw a bid once demand equals supply). Finally, in SMRAs, bidders do not need to affirmatively bid in every round for licenses that they have provisionally won as they will have an opportunity to bid again in the next round if their provisionally winning bid is outbid in the current round. These differences make any direct comparisons difficult. Nevertheless, with all these caveats in mind and using a simple moving average to “smooth” the variations in demand that you see from round-to-round in an SMRA, I thought that it might still be interesting to make a comparison between Auction 97 and this auction.




Fun: Comparing Current PEA Prices to Predicted Prices Based on Prior FCC Auctions after Round 97:

In the bubble graph below, we attempt to track how current PEA prices (on a price per MHz pop basis) compare to their "Predicted Price" based on past FCC auctions. To accomplish this comparison, we need to introduce the concept of the "Overprice Ratio". This Overprice Ratio is the current price of each PEA divided by the Predicted Price for that PEA.

This Predicted Price for any PEA is calculated by first classifying each PEA into its relevant REAG (an FCC licensing schema that divides the country into 6 regions) and then identifying a "Reference Market" for that REAG. Typically, the Reference Market for each REAG is the largest PEA by population (with the exception of the Southeast REAG where we selected Atlanta as its Reference Market rather than Washington DC, which we have reclassified as being in the Northeast REAG). For those PEAs that are Reference Markets, we use the New York PEA (the "Nationwide Reference Market") as their Reference Market. We then take the current price for each Reference Market and multiply it by the historical ratio of auction prices between each PEA and its Reference Market to get the Predicted Price.

The y-axis on the left shows the log (base 10) of the "Overprice Ratio." We take the log of the Overprice Ratio to lessen the impact of outliers. By definition, the New York PEA (shown in the graph as the biggest bubble in dark blue below), as the Nationwide Reference Market, will always remain at y=0 (the horizontal green line in the graph below).

In addition, the x-axis shows aggregate demand in each PEA after the latest round. There is a vertical green line where aggregate demand equals 14. This the maximum number of licenses available for sale in eac PEA. Thus, if the bubble shows up to the right of this green vertical line, aggregate demand in this PEA is greater than supply. Also, the y-axis on the right side of the graph tracks the current price for New York PEA after the latest round and is adjusted so that New York PEA's price always remains on the green horizontal line in the graph below. Finally, the bubbles representing the PEAs are sized based on population and color-coded based on the PEA that they fall in.

Example:
Pick San Diego. Its Reference Market is Los Angeles.

Suppose
San Diego current aggregate demand = 10
San Diego current price (average across categories) = $0.50
Los Angeles current price (average across categories) = $0.75
Historical ratio (San Diego/Los Angeles) = 1.09784

Compute
San Diego current Predicted Price = $0.75 * 1.09784 = $0.82338
San Diego Overprice Ratio = $0.50 / $0.82338 = 0.607253
San Diego logarithmic-scaled Overprice Ratio = Log10(0.607253) = -0.21663

Interpretation
In the logarithmic-scaled chart below, San Diego is represented by a bubble with coordinates (x,y) = (10,-0.21663). That means San Diego is underpriced. All bubbles with negative values are underpriced; conversely, all bubbles with positive values are overpriced with respect to their Reference Market's current price. Before the Reference Market's price converges, any underpriced PEA is a valid prediction due to the non-decreasing price property; however, the converse may not be true until the Reference Market's price converges.

To get the complete list of Reference Markets, Predicted Prices and Overprice Ratios for any PEA see the Table below.


Deals Following Round 97: Most Underpriced PEAs (Above 1 Million in Population) Relative to their Predicted Price:
Market Number Market Name Population Aggregate Demand Supply Bidding Units Ave. Current Price MHz Pop (for PEA) Reference Market Reference Market Name Predicted Price (for PEA) Overprice Ratio (Log Base 10)
PEA038 Milwaukee, WI 1,555,908 14 14 46,700 $2.086550 PEA003 Chicago, IL $3.184116 -0.183560
PEA009 Miami, FL 6,291,880 14 14 188,800 $1.548623 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $1.911639 -0.091460
PEA018 San Diego, CA 3,095,313 14 14 92,900 $1.773020 PEA002 Los Angeles, CA $1.946501 -0.040541
PEA013 Orlando, FL 4,562,642 14 14 136,900 $0.960657 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $1.038127 -0.033682
PEA002 Los Angeles, CA 19,410,169 14 14 582,300 $1.344487 PEA001 New York, NY $1.441436 -0.030239
PEA010 Houston, TX 5,891,999 14 14 176,800 $1.345919 PEA008 Dallas, TX $1.332368 0.004395
PEA039 Oklahoma City, OK 1,446,527 14 14 43,400 $1.769386 PEA008 Dallas, TX $1.723951 0.011298
PEA003 Chicago, IL 9,366,713 14 14 281,000 $1.100623 PEA001 New York, NY $1.031450 0.028190
PEA029 Jacksonville, FL 1,918,264 14 14 57,500 $1.042990 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $0.956648 0.037528
PEA021 Tampa, FL 2,783,243 14 14 83,500 $1.467440 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $1.337619 0.040228
PEA015 Phoenix, AZ 3,817,117 14 14 114,500 $1.690720 PEA002 Los Angeles, CA $1.503714 0.050906
PEA028 San Antonio, TX 1,999,689 14 14 60,000 $1.043412 PEA008 Dallas, TX $0.897884 0.065235
PEA008 Dallas, TX 6,452,472 14 14 193,600 $1.619091 PEA001 New York, NY $1.379476 0.069557
PEA005 Baltimore, MD-Washington, DC 7,842,134 14 14 235,300 $1.235652 PEA001 New York, NY $1.025639 0.080902
PEA043 Charlotte, NC 1,327,006 14 14 39,800 $1.423098 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $1.148449 0.093123
PEA045 Raleigh, NC 1,302,381 14 14 39,100 $1.461076 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $1.178498 0.093344
PEA030 Kansas City, MO 1,810,075 14 14 54,300 $1.041634 PEA001 New York, NY $0.839497 0.093696
PEA020 Denver, CO 2,789,669 14 14 83,700 $1.239217 PEA008 Dallas, TX $0.937844 0.121017
PEA040 Birmingham, AL 1,399,686 14 14 42,000 $1.462691 PEA011 Atlanta, GA $1.105570 0.121566
PEA035 Austin, TX 1,628,809 14 14 48,900 $1.351147 PEA008 Dallas, TX $1.005719 0.128226


BONUS VIDEO: Review Round-by-Round Bidding with Video Showing Change in Demand for Round 1 through Round 97:




BONUS VIDEO 2 : Review Round-by-Round Bidding with Video Showing in 3D Gross Proceeds for Round 1 through Round 97:
NOTE: In this video, Category A proceeds are represented by the blue bars, Category BC proceeds are represented by the violet bars and Category C are represented by the green bars.








Download to Excel or View Details on All PEAs After Round 97:

Selected PEA Details
Market Number Market Name Category Population Bidding Units Supply Aggregate Demand Excess Demand Demand Change Posted Price Gross Proceeds Price Per MHz POP (for product) Fully Loaded Price Per MHz POP (for product) Price Per MHz POP (for PEA) Reference Market Number Reference Market Name Predicted Price (for PEA) Overprice Ratio (Log Base10)